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Article
Classical music as
enforced Utopia
Daniel Leech-Wilkinson
King’s College London, UK
Abstract
In classical music composition, whatever thematic or harmonic conflicts may be engin-
eered along the way, everything always turns out for the best. Similar utopian thinking
underlies performance: performers see their job as faithfully carrying out their master’s
(the composer’s) wishes. The more perfectly they represent them, the happier the
result. But why should performers not have a critical role to play in re-presenting a
score, just as actors are permitted – required even – to find new meanings and new
relevance in texts? And what or whom are performers obeying, the long dead com-
poser (and what is the ethical basis for that?) or a policing system (teachers, examiners,
adjudicators, critics, agents, promoters, record producers) that enforces an imaginary
tradition from childhood to grave? Starting from the evidence of early recordings,
showing that composers are misrepresented, this article seeks to unpick some of the
delusions that support classical music practice.
Keywords
Composers’ intentions, early recordings, musical performance norms, performance
practice, performance style, radical performance, utopias
Some delusions
It seems increasingly obvious that western classical music is essentially an oral
culture imagining itself to be a written culture. Musicians learn their craft via
practical, one-to-one studio teaching (supplemented by workshops, masterclasses
and rehearsals) in which beliefs about how scores should be played are passed on
orally and by example, sharing the assumption that the notation already encodes
most of the information one needs from the past about how the music should
sound. ‘Historically informed performance’ (HIP) sometimes refers to written
documentation (especially performance treatises) from the past; but after nearly
half a century of modern practice HIP is now substantially passed on as a collection
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of agreements among HIP players about what is stylish (Leech-Wilkinson and
Prior, 2014: 50–52). The earliest recordings (from ca. 1900) oﬀer us the ﬁrst
chance to compare treatises with the playing of their authors: the comparison
suggests that written information (which is generally far more detailed ca. 1900
than in the past) is far from suﬃcient to allow performers to reconstruct the sounds
we hear the authors of these treatises make on record (Leech-Wilkinson, 2012:
para. 3.4). How much truer must that be of the more distant past? Recordings
show that performance changes very greatly over time, that we cannot know how it
sounded much before the 1870s (the early maturity of the oldest performers on
record), and that scores do not encode nearly as much information from the past as
we think they do. However, you look at it, classical music practice is an oral
tradition to which writing contributes much less than we maintain.
A second delusion, one deeply embedded in teaching, practice, criticism and
even legislation (which ascribes rights in a score to composers but not to per-
formers who turn it into music), is the notion that composers are the creatives
and performers their faithful servants, reproducing their intentions in sound, per-
forming beautifully yet dutifully, as a lovely spouse carrying out her domestic duty
to perfection. Musicians do perform wonderfully at the moment, perhaps more
perfectly than ever before. But that does not mean that all is well, or that we are not
dealing with a master–slave relationship or, simply, a delusion. Again, 120 years of
recordings provide the deﬁnitive evidence: as performance styles change over time,
our understandings of compositions and of their composers change too (Leech-
Wilkinson, 2013). Performers, in other words, have been doing a very large part of
the meaning making all along. And, far from seeing this as unwarranted interfer-
ence that we should try to tame, we would do better to recognise it as a truth of
musical practice, one to be celebrated, and one for which performers are owed
recognition and reward.
I shall illustrate this brieﬂy next, but what I really want to ask is what follows.
Because although it seems inconceivable from within classical music’s ideological
bubble, we can see from both recordings and experiment that scores could be
performed wonderfully quite diﬀerently, and there seems every reason, if we
want classical music to ﬁnd new audiences and to have a healthy future, to look
for quite new ways of making the same notes work.
Historical evidence
A video recording of Arturo Benedetti Michelangeli playing Brahms’s Ballade Op.
10 No. 4 in b minor shows us much about the way Brahms is currently con-
structed.1 Michelangeli spends a full 14 s, after raising his hands to the keyboard,
preparing himself mentally for the great challenge of enabling this masterpiece to
speak. The performance is dreamy, his expression reverential. We worship the
composer for his exquisite creation.
Ilona Eibenschu¨tz recorded the same score within a series of ‘Reminiscences of
Brahms’ recorded in 1952.2 Eibenschu¨tz knew Brahms. She was one of Clara
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Schumann’s pupils and was the ﬁrst person to whom he played his Op. 118 or 119
piano pieces: she reports overhearing him saying ‘She is the pianist I best like
to hear playing my works’ (Evans, 2012). She recorded in 1903 and again in
1951–1952, and the piece she recorded on both occasions (the Ballade in g minor
Op. 118 No. 3) is performed almost identically. So there are good reasons to trust
this 1952 performance of Op. 10 No. 4 as passing on some historical information
about how Brahms sounded within his own circle. Her speed is 60 per cent faster
than Michelangeli’s (concordant with the generally faster speeds of her generation
compared to recent, more reverential performances): the piece comes across as
light, almost salon music, certainly no object of worship. Nor is there any sense
in her reminiscences that she thought of Brahms as divine. But this is what happens
to composers once they have been gone a while. They become prophets at least,
passing on the Word which the performer’s job is to convey faithfully to the people.
There is much more evidence, gathered together in the remarkable study of Scott
(2014), that Eibenschu¨tz’s recordings, and those of other pupils of Clara
Schumann, pass on Brahms’s intentions relatively faithfully (also Musgrave,
2003). Their performances are radically unlike ours, much less predictable, with
rubato used to an extent that to us is incomprehensible as ‘musical’, rushing ahead
with crescendi, slowing with diminuendi, dislocating the hands, speeding across
phrase-ends rather than slowing down. None of this is allowable today. So how
faithfully are Brahms’s wishes being carried out now? And if a pianist were to give
us the historical Brahms today – light, uneven, irregular, unpredictable – which
exams could they pass, who would promote them, who would hire them to give a
high-proﬁle concert or make a recording?
Carl Reinecke’s playing of Mozart in 1905 is in some ways even further from
modern practice (and just as far from modern fortepiano playing, ‘historically
informed’ by written documents and early pianos).3 A leading nineteenth-century
conductor, composer and teacher, Reinecke, was born in 1824, the year of
Beethoven’s ninth symphony. One might think his view of Mozart would be of
some interest to musicians concerned (as all claim to be) to realize the composer’s
intentions, if not relevant to Mozart (who died, after all, in 1791) then to music of
the mid-nineteenth century (Schumann, say) when Reinecke’s own performance
style would have matured. Reinecke breaks just about every rule of modern piano
playing: his hands are almost never synchronized, he spreads chords, he uses
marked rhythmic inequality during melodic ﬂourishes, and much more; and so
his evidence is simply not acceptable within the current model of faithfulness to
a composer.
There are hundreds, perhaps thousands of examples like this from the earliest
years of recordings, oﬀering insights into nineteenth-century practices which sound
bewilderingly unlike our own (Brown, 1999; Cook, 2013; Leech-Wilkinson, 2009a;
Milsom, 2003; Peres da Costa, 2012; Philip, 1992). Music has changed more than
one could ever have imagined. Scores we think must be performed one way were
performed quite diﬀerently a century ago. For composers then alive or recently
dead that means that we are unquestionably not being faithful to composers’
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wishes in modern performances. And it shows too, and this is much more import-
ant, that the same notes can make (and have made) substantially diﬀerent music.
And yet, the whole ethos and structure, the entire system that constitutes music
teaching and examining and writing about musical performance today, from ﬁrst
lessons, through graded examinations, the conservatories, the criteria by which
people are judged as musical or unmusical players, as suitable or unsuitable to
give concerts and make recordings, the judgements of agents, producers, critics and
connoisseurs, all depend on the belief that we know best and agree on how these
pieces are supposed to go, and that if they do not go that way we are not hearing
the music of their composers and not behaving as competent musicians.
Yet clearly we are not hearing the music of their composers when we do it our
way, and equally clearly competence can only be judged in relation to a particular
performance style. So the notion that music teachers, examiners, critics, agents and
the rest know how scores ought to sound is a delusion. They know only what they
think is proper at the moment. To justify that preference by calls on the composer,
and on claims about what was intended in the past, requires a level of knowledge of
the performing past before ca. 1900 that no one has or will ever have. Our know-
ledge of the performance past is inadequate, therefore, to justify the enforcement of
performance norms. Historically, not just theoretically, the claim that we know
what is appropriate to a composer or a composition from much before 1900 is
bogus. And for it to be true for music after 1900 we shall have to pay a lot more
attention to period recordings than we do at present.
Ethics
Is the claim also ethically unfounded? Suppose we did know how a score used to
go, as we may for late Brahms and as we do for Grieg, Debussy and every com-
poser thereafter: what obligation do we have to reproduce that? A worn out ques-
tion, you might think; for so much has been written by performers, musicologists
and music philosophers about the performer’s duty to the composer.4 But it is a
question that demands, now we can hear the size of the problem, to be readdressed.
As ever with ethics, the underlying question is who is harmed? Who is harmed
when the Brahms ballade, Op. 10 No. 4, is played by Michelangeli rather than
Eibenschu¨tz? Certainly not Brahms. We imagine him harmed because we imagine
him present, listening in as we ask a pupil, ‘What does Brahms want in b. 23?’
(Note the present tense.) But Brahms is dead. His estate is long-since wound up and
there are no lingering issues of intellectual property. Or if you think there are then
you have a very long list of performers and teachers, examiners and critics to start
suing.
Is the listener harmed by hearing a diﬀerent reading of a text? If they are then
what damage is done to them when they go to the theatre to see Shakespeare? Do
we feel damaged by seeing King Lear in a new light? On the contrary, that is why
we go. Yet for classical music, the very idea of changing a score’s meaning seems
scandalous.
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A photograph in the archive of the Royal Shakespeare Company of a moment
from a 2009 performance of Hamlet shows the Hamlet (David Tennant), dressed
in dinner jacket, holding up a modern barber’s mirror.5 The production is set in the
claustrophobic, illusion-peddling world of Euro royals: their palaces, their taste,
their money, their emotional and moral confusion. Nothing unusual there, you
may think: this is a modern production of an early seventeenth-century text
which vividly shows its relevance to our times, imagining how easily such a story
might ﬁnd its way into the pages of magazines like Hello! Shakespeare’s text was
written around 1600, published in 1603, contemporary with John Dowland’s
second and third Bookes of Songs and William Byrd’s Gradualia. Why then
would we not give those texts performances, set in other period sound worlds,
that said something pertinent about their continuing relevance to us? Why not
Byrd as political protest? Such things might occasionally happen, but never as
an everyday performance in a typical concert setting. There they would be regarded
as populist and perverted, a travesty of the composer’s intentions (as if an Oxbridge
choir is not). What is our problem with innovation, or even imagination, in musical
performance? Why are we so horriﬁed at giving classical music the same licence we
give classical theatre?
Utopian dystopias
Perhaps because we practise classical music as Utopia, a perfect society, walled oﬀ
from the rest of the world, which it would be unforgivable to disrupt. Utopias work
when everyone follows the same rules. The rules seem good, they have settled into
place through long practice and are known to work, and we agree to abide by them.
But to do that requires authority: rules entail a ruler. The ruler for these purposes is
imagined as the composer. But the composer is just a ﬁgurehead, a way of packa-
ging up all our supposed obligations into one, the composer’s intentions, and of
thereby protecting that package from any hint of criticism. For Utopias are inher-
ently totalitarian: everyone has to obey the beloved leader.
Upbringing makes these rules normative. At ﬁrst, this is not a problem. The
young musician accepts their teacher’s word, learns the rules: play what the com-
poser says (sic.), get praise. Youngmusicians feel they are being creative as they learn
the moves their body needs to make to sound acceptably expressive: as the moves
start to work they are happy to accept the beloved leader as the source of their
delight. Normativity constructs nature through practice (in this case literally practis-
ing one’s instrument). Or you could think of it as naturalisation supported by false
history (‘this is Mozartian, this is Brahmsian’). Either way, as the years of training
accumulate, the word of one’s teacher, the examples of one’s idols, the requirements
of examinations and competitions fuse with one’s own experience of thousands of
hours of practice, aﬀording increasingly expert results, to embed within one’s body
the conviction that these musical behaviours are natural. One seems to be drawing
on laws of musical nature, ﬁnding their ideal expression in one’s playing and
reaﬃrming it in every successful performance. Norms become naturalized.
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But norms are nonetheless oppressive, doubly so when based on false history;
and as the student learns to behave within them (accepting ‘heavy community
censorship’, Hill, 2012: 89) they are also aware of gradually increasing fear: fear
of making a mistake, fear of playing out of style, fear of non-conforming, of being
judged unsuitable for work, of being judged ‘unmusical’ – that ultimate judgement
which Kingsbury (1988: 65), writing of conservatoire culture, calls ‘a statement of
doom’. ‘Musical’, at conservatoire, becomes the stamp of approval on your Party
membership card: if you have it you are allowed to seek work, if not, not. With fear
comes stress, anxiety, and performance-related illness, a plague now for which the
ideology may well be substantially responsible (Ginsborg et al., 2012).
The performance police are everywhere. Teachers, examiners, adjudicators,
agents, critics, promoters, producers, record reviewers, bloggers. Performance is
policed from ﬁrst lesson to farewell recital. Above all, and right through their lives,
performers police themselves, for this is a classic Gramscian hegemony. By sub-
scribing to the elite values of their professional models, performers sustain and
nurture their enslavement, and that of their young students, to this constructed
world of artiﬁcial performance norms.
But like all police states, this one too is based on lies. The ﬁrst is that musical
works exist. This is a remarkably persistent meme which became embedded during
the nineteenth century (Goehr, 1992) and is now so normative that it is hard to see
how false it is. Scores exist, but music does not; rather it happens (Leech-
Wilkinson, 2012). That it happens similarly every time a score is performed rein-
forces the sense that something stable must lie beneath. But in fact, our sense of a
work rests in nothing more than recollections of moments of previous perform-
ances. When we speak of ‘Beethoven’s ﬁfth’, we seem to be speaking of something
(some thing), but in fact we are speaking of a potential experience over time, or of
some aspect of that experience, or of the composition that preceded the score, or of
the score that transmits what little information survives concerning what the com-
poser imagined. There is nothing ‘out there’, nothing existing, except the score. The
danger with thinking of music in terms of these notional works is that one then
easily comes to suppose that they have a ﬁxed form which it is one’s job as a
performer to ﬁnd once again.
The second sustaining lie is that there are or were composers’ intentions, that
they are known, and that they matter. Composers often, perhaps usually, imagine
music in great detail as they compose, and they write down some aspect of what
they imagine into a score. But they are often very happy for performers to show
them ways they had not imagined of sounding their scores. Often they work with
the performance style of particular performers in mind; always they write with the
general performance style of their place and time as the environment in which they
imagine music. There is no stepping outside the performance stylistic world in
which one lives (Leech-Wilkinson, 2009b). Composers’ intentions, then, are limited
by when and where they live; they are not communicable to performers except in a
very sketchy way, supplemented, while they are alive and available to be asked, by
whatever they can explain in words or by example; their intentions can be modiﬁed
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or willingly set aside by things performers do that they ﬁnd they like; and when
they are dead they have none at all any more. They certainly cannot encompass all
the possibilities aﬀorded by their scores.
For the third lie is that there are limited possibilities inherent in a score, perhaps
only one ideal performance. Recordings make clear that this is simply not true.
There have already been hugely diﬀerent musical characters found in scores that
have been recorded through the past century. We have seen some examples already.
Moreover, experiment with performers quickly shows that scores can be persua-
sively performed (that is to say, make convincing musical sense to one who knows
nothing of the score or its recent performance tradition) in ways that are as far as
possible from the indications contained in the score. In a previous article, I pro-
vided the example of Beethoven’s ‘Moonlight’ sonata, which makes an excellent
storm in the ﬁrst movement played allegro furioso, a touching Mendelssohnian
slow movement in the second played andante, and so on (Leech-Wilkinson, 2013:
51–52). That this was not Beethoven’s intention is clear, but that does not prevent
these approaches working very well and entirely unproblematically to anyone who
has never heard the piece played another way. Refuting such performances, in
other words, has to be done on ideological grounds, not musical.
One could add the lie that someone else – teachers, but ultimately the beloved
leader – always knows best. Why are performers so subservient, so obedient? In
another study I discuss this in relation to infant/carer vocalization and its relation-
ship with adult music. Here it will be more helpful to point back to the education
process through which musicians have passed. It is impossible to qualify as a per-
former without accepting current performance norms: the system selects only those
who are obedient; the rest give up music along the way. And so careers are denied
to those who do not care to conform. This is the nature of Utopia: you conform or
you leave.
Creativity, real and imagined
Where, then, is the creativity which classical musicians feel is part of their everyday
engagement with composers’ scores? First it lies in the small variations that are
acceptable within everyday practice. How extensive is the range within which per-
formers are licensed to vary performances itself varies from generation to gener-
ation. Recordings show us that in the early twentieth century there were many
diﬀerent approaches still to be heard at one and the same time. D’Albert, de
Pachmann, Cortot, Godowsky, were very diﬀerent kinds of musician. National
styles were still audibly diﬀerent then. By contrast, between the 1950s and 2000s,
the range was rather narrow. Over the past decade or two, greater variety has
begun to reappear among younger musicians; and it is partly this that leads me
to believe that the time to address these problems head on, with some hope of
change as a result, may have come. So there is creativity, and performers feel that
they exercise it, but most of the diﬀerences between performances that result
are unnoticeable by non-specialists. This is curious. And one wonders why
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non-specialist audiences continue to attend concerts knowing exactly how each
piece will seem to them. Partly this must be a matter of the comfort of the
known. But then again, audiences for conventional concerts are ageing. So there
does seem to be a problem.
If there is some creativity for performers, what about innovation? It seems that
those two concepts (variation within, as opposed to changes to, performance
norms) need to be separated in thinking about the performance practice of classical
music today. Innovation, as we have seen in thinking about Byrd, is clearly not
allowed in approved practice. And yet it does happen, albeit by accident and in tiny
steps, too small for anyone to observe. This is the conclusion of studies into per-
formance style change (see Leech-Wilkinson, 2009b). Performance style does
change, massively over time, and that process must involve a sequence of innova-
tive steps away from norms. That we never hear these moments of change indi-
vidually (if we did the innovators would be condemned) shows that each must be
tiny, but they nonetheless must be picked up unawares by other performers, and
thus gradually spread around in a process of gradual cultural evolution (Leech-
Wilkinson, 2009b: 256–257).
Why does change have to happen by accident? Given that, as we can now see, it
is certain to happen anyway, and has been happening for a century past, and
presumably continuously before then, why cannot we accept it as natural – genu-
inely so since it is a process of natural selection of the most useful accidental
mutations – and then drive it quite deliberately ourselves, creating a culture of
innovation with all the critical and economic beneﬁts that could bring? One only
has to look back to the invention of HIP in the late 1960s, and its continuous
evolution since, to see how over time a forcibly innovative practice can become
acceptable as a parallel stream of performance practice, with its own departments
in conservatories, increasingly assimilated into the mainstream to the point where
even experts can ﬁnd it diﬃcult to be sure whether historical or modern instruments
are being used (Kenyon, 2013).
Why, then, do we need a police state for classical music? Why are we so frigh-
tened of alternative practice? We have already seen how powerful are the eﬀects of
naturalization through practice and repetition. I pursue elsewhere (in a study in
progress) the possibility that the comfort people ﬁnd in music contributes to its
tendency to infantilise participants. Add in a teaching system in which nanny
knows best, with teachers falling back on that oldest trick of poor parenting,
‘Play like this because I say so’, reﬁned by the killer, ‘If you don’t you won’t get
work.’ And you have a system in which musicians feel that there is no alternative to
doing as they are told.
It is highly eﬃcient, of course. It makes the rehearsals run on time. For there is
also a powerful economic imperative enforced by employers: the clearer everyone is
about how each score is to be played, the less rehearsal is needed, the cheaper the
costs, the smaller the loss. Yet repetition palls and audiences decline: and so the
imperative to cut costs becomes ever harsher. Not only, then, are musicians slaves
to a fantasy of the omnipotent composer, but at the same time they ﬁnd themselves
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subject also to the all-too-real demands of promoters. And the former prevents the
latter from exploring a perfectly obvious capitalistic solution: to innovate (at the
cost of a modicum of R&D investment) so as to attract new audiences generating
proﬁts to fund the investment. Perhaps it is time on economic grounds, then, as
well as historical, ethical and artistic, to consider the possible beneﬁts of innov-
ation. For the good of musicians’ psychological health, there is a strong case to be
made for allowing greater agency through personal creativity. In sum, there are a
plenty of reasons why musicians might beneﬁt from facing down the performance
police, taking responsibility for their own performances, and discovering new kinds
of musicalities through which to allow these endlessly reproduced scores to mean
something new.
It is not easy. Clearly our sense of what is musical cannot lie outside the music-
ality that constructs us, because we have to believe in order to perform persua-
sively. Performance styles have to become embodied, and that takes time,
experiment and practice. But we cannot begin without challenging those expressive
and interpretative habits that we have allowed to construct us as musicians. We can
subvert them by constructing alternative performance styles, while recognising that
subversion has to be a continuous process of change, not the establishment of new
norms. That was HIP’s mistake: that it attempted to ﬁnd the correct way to per-
form a score, measured against an imagined historical original, and then to enforce
it forever. But although their ideology was sick, HIP musicians were fantastically
inventive in making a new style. We need to be that inventive again, only this time
not to pretend that we are either historical or correct.
What is not ethically acceptable, I suggest, is to recognise the problem in
theory and then do nothing practical about it: there has to a practical project
alongside this dismantling of the beliefs underpinning classical music’s utopian
police state. It has to oﬀer examples of how innovation can work, that is to say,
how performances can be made which are not enslaved to current beliefs about
the styles proper to composers or scores, nor to the scores themselves (bearing
in mind that the composers are dead and unable to be distressed to ﬁnd that
their scores can be powerfully performed in ways quite other than they ima-
gined). Just as with HIP, only thrilling examples of new approaches to old
scores will persuade musicians to take the enormous risk of changing their
beliefs and practices.
Radical performance
So we need a radical performance project, generating very diﬀerent performances,
for which I propose nine aims:
1. To test how much of a piece’s character is encoded in the notes
2. To challenge the infantilising authority of performance teaching
3. To oﬀer students a technique for expanding their imaginative relationship with
scores
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4. To test the possibilities for and consequences of freeing classical performance
from its self-imposed framework of moral obligations
5. To follow the logic of the process of performance style change in order to see
where else it might go
6. To explore the extent to which the notions ‘musical’ and ‘unmusical’ are ideo-
logically grounded
7. To give performers due credit for the huge contribution they make to the cre-
ation of music, and correspondingly to reduce the role of composer to approxi-
mate that of playwright
8. To enrich our concert life by introducing the notion of production into perform-
ance of scores, with commercial beneﬁts for artists, promoters, record compa-
nies, and attracting new audiences
9. To open up new possibilities for thought about the relationship between music
and the individual
How might these aims be realized? I propose two starting-points, from which
creative practice can gradually diverge. First, following the examples provided by
Sla˚ttebrekk (2010) and (even more innovatively) by Scott (2014), we take historical
recordings from the very earliest years of the last century, when performance styles
were less like our own than anything else we can hear, and begin to learn to play
using the performance styles they document. That entails doing a lot of things that
are more or less opposite to what is currently thought to be best practice. This is an
excellent way of discovering how the opposite of orthodoxy can produce equally,
even more powerful performances. Moreover, as one begins to see how not syn-
chronizing parts, and not playing in time, and not sounding composed structure,
not sticking exactly to the letter of the score, can all aﬀord engaging expressivity,
one begins to see how such techniques taken individually and pursued further, can
allow one to ﬁnd new, previously unimagined habits of performance style that
work.
The second approach to freeing up our relationship with scores is in some ways
opposite, anti-historical. This is to take scores and deliberately modify an aspect of
received performance practice according to a systematic sequence of moves, in
order to see what happens, to discover how each modiﬁcation can (or occasionally,
but rarely it seems, cannot) be made to work. An extreme form of this approach,
but a very good one with which to begin, is that recommended above in connection
with the Moonlight sonata; that is to say, take a score and do as far as possible the
opposite of the expressive indications it contains. Fast becomes slow, loud becomes
soft, and so on. Discovering how well pieces respond to this treatment is itself
liberating. Proceeding more cautiously opens up a host of other techniques, includ-
ing systematically placing emphases on diﬀerent beats, diﬀerent positions within a
contour, or a text, or in a tonal hierarchy, and so on, testing one’s ability at each
point to make a counter-normative reading work; that is to say, to give it plausible
musico-dramatic shape through expressive departures from a literal, machine read-
ing of the notation (for that is what performance style, or ‘musicality’ does).
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In conclusion
What we do with music, and what music does with us, becomes central to all of us
once we understand the freedom – historical, ethical, technical – that performers
have to make music mean. Performers must be allowed to share in the process of
creating music from scores, in the satisfaction and the credit for creativity that
accrues when they and their listeners recognize how much they have provided, and
also in rights payments that are morally though not yet legally owed to them for
their contribution which I suggest at least equals that of the composer. (Changing
the law so that performers are no longer junior partners is a long-term project but
one that it is time to begin.)
If we could transform our attitude to performer agency along the lines I have
suggested here, there just might be a chance that western classical music could oﬀer
more than comfort for the already comfortable, could be relevant to much more
diverse audiences, could show us something challenging about ourselves, could be
innovative, promoting not damaging performer health, encouraging not dismissing
aspiring musicians creative enough to have ideas of their own.
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Notes
1. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v¼KNqjr8Z_O2I
2. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v¼mLGIRHCPqN4 beginning at 9’ 45’’.
3. See for example, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v¼JsQwvZmU8Yw, https://www.you
tube.com/watch?v¼XXapt6YRxkY.
4. For an overview of some of this see Leech-Wilkinson (2009).
5. http://www.rsc.org.uk/images/content/Productions-2009/ham_08_mirror_243x317.jpg
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